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Riegle-Neal's 10% Nationwide Deposit Cap: Arbitrary and
Unnecessary
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004 Bank of America bought FleetBoston in a $49.3 billion
all-stock transaction, giving it 9.9% of all federally-insured deposits in
the United States.1 In the same year, Morgan Chase announced that it
would acquire Bank One, increasing its share of the nation's deposits to
6.7%.2 These mergers made Bank of America and J.P. Morgan first and
second, respectively, in share of national deposits held.3
United States banking laws limit the expansion of banks and
bank holding companies,4 primarily by prohibiting transactions that
would result in the consolidated bank holding more than ten percent of
the nation's bank deposits.' These constraints stem from the established
tradition of decentralized banking, aimed at protecting smaller banks
and promoting market competition.6 This theory has been the
foundation upon which bank expansion regulation has traditionally
rested.7
As the recent J.P. Morgan and Bank of America mergers
demonstrate, an increasing number of banks are using mergers to

1. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FED. RES. BULL.: BANK OF
AMERICA - FLEETBOSTON, ORDER APPROVING THE MERGER OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES

11
(2004) at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/presslorders/2004/20040308/
attachment.pdf [hereinafter BANK OF AMERICA].
2. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FED. RES. BULL.: MORGAN
CHASE & CO. - BANK ONE CORPORATION, ORDER APPROVING THE MERGER OF BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES 2-3 (2004) at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/

2004/20040614/attachment.pdf.
3. BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 1, at 11; Barbara A. Rehm, The Beltway Perspective
on Quest to Be 'National',AM. BANKER, Feb. 6, 2004, at 1.

4. A bank holding company is a company that has control over any bank or over any
other company that has control over any bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2000).
5. 12 U.S.C. §1842(d)(2)(A) (2000).
6. Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Too Big to Fail,Too Few to Serve? The PotentialRisks of
Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 969-76 (1992).
7. See generally WILLIAM A. LOVETT, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW

185 (5th ed. 2001); JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 345-70

(3d ed. 2001); see infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
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expand into new geographic and product markets.8 According to Bank
of America chief executive Kenneth D. Lewis, if the deposit cap were
not a constraint, Bank of America might be interested in solidifying its
position in the Midwest, the one region where it still lacks a
commanding presence. 9 However, the current law virtually forecloses
the possibility that Bank of America could merge again, absent growth
in the national deposit base or an expansion of the nationwide deposit
cap. 10 Thus, as more banks expand, the effects of the national deposit
cap will become more important, making this a real and pressing issue
in the industry."
Part II of this note briefly describes the legislative history of
interstate banking and branching restrictions and the motivations that
have traditionally driven geographic banking expansion regulations. 2 It
also details the legislative purpose behind the enactment of the RiegleNeal Act Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act ("the RiegleNeal Act"), as well as the ten percent nationwide deposit cap set forth as
part of that Act.' 3 Part III discusses why the national deposit cap is
arbitrary, unnecessary and harmful to consumers.' 4 Part IV illustrates
that the formula used to calculate the deposit cap has been applied
inconsistently among mergers, detracting from the significance of the
deposit cap as a means of measuring market concentration. 15
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE RIEGLE-NEAL ACT
A.

History of Interstate Banking and InterstateBranching Priorto
the Riegle-Neal Act

Bank branching and ownership are the two ways to expand a
bank's service area. 16 Bank branching involves the establishment of
8. Rehm, supra note 3, at 1.
9. David Boraks, B of A Gaining Wiggle Room for Deal, 169 AM. BANKER, Nov. 3,
2004, at 1.
10. Sasha Talcott, Banks Lobbying for Room to Grow, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 3, 2004, at
El.
11. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See discussion infra Part
See discussion infra Part
See discussion infra Part
See discussion infra Part
See generally MACEY ET

II.A.
II.B.
Ill.
IV.
AL., supra note 7, at 18-20, 24-25.
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separate but dependent banking facilities that are part of the central
bank.' 7 The branches perform many of the same banking functions as
18
the main bank, but are physically separate from the main office.
Through the establishment of these new branches, banks can physically
expand their operations into geographic areas not previously serviced,
as well as easily move money from one locality to another.' 9 Prior to
the enactment of the Riegle-Neal Act, national banks could only branch
within a state to the same extent allowed for state banks in that state.2 °
This authorization was very limited, as states only had the authority to
authorize branching within their home state.21
Bank ownership involves expansion of the bank's service area
through either purchasing an already existing institution or establishing
a new institution in the state where a presence is desired.2 2 This method
of expansion was also restricted prior to the Riegle-Neal Act by
legislation precluding bank holding companies from owning banks in
other states unless the host state law specifically authorized out-of-state
ownership.23 Although several states passed statutes permitting such
ownership in limited circumstances, the majority of these state statues
were predicated on reciprocal agreements between states and therefore
led to regional groups of states across which bank ownership was
allowed.2 4
A driving force behind these restrictive pieces of legislation was
Congress' desire to ensure competitive equality between banks.2 5 Many
17. See generally id. at 13.
18. See generally id.; Beverly Hirtle and Christopher Metli, The Evolution of U.S. Bank
Branch Networks: Growth, Consolidationand Strategy, 10 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS
AND FINANCE, July 2004.

19. See generally MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 18-20; Hirtle, supra note 18.
20. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W.

MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL

SERVICE ACTIVITIES 57 (2d ed. 2004). This legislation was entitled the McFadden Act. Id.

21. Id. National banks with main offices close to a state border could take advantage of
a limited ability to relocate their main office across the state line and retain the former main
office as an interstate branch. Id. at 682.
22. See generally BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 20.

23. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 368. This provision was part of the Bank Holding
Company Act known as the Douglas Amendment. Id.; see also MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANK
REGULATION 83 (1999) (stating that the Bank Holding Company Act is the product of
congressional concern that economic concentration could lead to conflicts of interest, selfdealing, involuntary tying arrangements, and generally to a derogation of competition).
24. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 20, at 702; MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 357-

58.
25. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 973.
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members of Congress feared that unrestricted branching and ownership
would lead to large consolidated banks with monopolistic power over
access to credit in their respective trade areas.26 This would impede the
ability of those attempting commercial expansion, putting the power of
industrial growth in the hands of the banks and giving inordinate
economic power to a few private entities.27 In addition, these members
feared consolidation because they believed that large banks would
prefer the interests of the wealthy few, disregarding the interests of the
common people.28
During Senate discussions, Senator Douglas
explained that the legislation restricting geographic expansion would
prevent an "undue concentration of banking and financial power" and
29
"keep the private control of credit diffused as much as possible."
Proponents of geographic restrictions argued that such
restrictions prevent undue concentration and that concentration reduces
competition, thus lowering service quality and increasing price.3 ° In a
monopolistic market, typically, fewer desired goods and services are
distributed at a higher price, thus harming consumers. 31 The goal of
decentralized banking, therefore, is to protect consumers against the
high prices and lack of choice associated with market consolidation.3 2
Another argument in support of branching and banking
restrictions was that only community-oriented banks 33 could be relied
on to provide the loans and other banking services needed to develop
the economies of smaller cities, towns, and rural areas.34 Proponents of
26. See id.; see also MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 346.

27. Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 973.
28. 67 CONG. REC. H2,832 (1926) (statement of Rep. McFadden); id. at H3,248
(statement of Rep. Cannon).
29. Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 976. Senator Douglas contended that the highly
concentrated banking systems in Britain and Canada contributed to the widespread
development of industrial cartels and monopolies in those countries. Id. He further charged
that the dominant banks in Germany supported the German industrial cartels and had
facilitated the rise of Hitler. Id. Douglas declared that his amendment was part of "the
fighting tradition of Andrew Jackson who wanted a competitive and free America and not
one dominated by a relatively small group of financiers and industrialists." Id.; see also
First Nat'l. Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
30. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 346.
31.

ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 3 (5th ed. 2003).

32. Id.
33. Community-oriented banks are banks whose branches were limited to their home
community. See 67 CONG. REC. H3,248 (1926) (statement of Rep. Cannon); Wilmarth,
supra note 6, at 973.
34. 65 CONG. REC. H 11,297 (1924) (statement of Rep. McFadden); 66 CONG. REC.
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the restrictions believed that local community-based control over
banking preserved a close relationship between those in the community
who needed credit and those who provided credit.35 Supporters argued
that community banks reinvest their deposits and profits by lending to
small businesses and farmers within their home areas, while large banks
drain funds from rural areas, redirecting them to large cities or
overseas.

36

This legislative paradigm helped shape the banking landscape as
an industry, favoring heavy regulation and division of market share and
power among many institutions. 37 This legacy can be seen in recent
legislation, even that which is supposed to provide for industry-wide
consolidation and growth.38
B.

The Riegle-Neal Act

In 1994, Congress enacted the Riegle-Neal Act, 39 which
preempted the many different state banking regulations and established
a consistent nationwide standard for interstate expansion by national
and state banks.4 ° It accomplished this by instituting a provision that
permits a bank holding company ("BHC") to acquire a bank located in a
state other than the home state of the BHC without regard to state law.4 '
Thus, the national banks no longer needed permission from state law to
acquire banks in that state. 42 The Riegle-Neal Act also permits
interstate branching. 43 Thus, the Riegle-Neal Act removed the vast
S4,437 (1925) (statement of Sen. Reed); 67 CONG. REC. H3,248 (1926) (statement of Rep.

Cannon).
35. Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 976.
36. 65 CONG. REC. HI 1,297 (1924) (statement of Rep. McFadden); 66 CONG. REC.
S4,437 (1925) (statement of Sen. Reed); 67 CONG. REC. H3,248 (1926) (statement of Rep.
Cannon).
37. See generally LOVETT, supra note 7, at 184.
38. See discussion infra Part II.B.
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (2000).
40. KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, REGULATION AND EFFECTS

176 (5th ed. 2000).
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1)(A) (2000).
42. Id.
43.

HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION

79 (11 th ed. 2004). The Act gave the states the discretion to remove themselves from the
statute (to opt out) and to reject branching attempts inside their states. Id. If they did not
choose to opt out prior to June 1, 1997, then branching through mergers fell within the
confines of the Act. Id. Currently, no states have legislation opting them out of the Act.
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majority of the barriers remaining to interstate banking and branching,
leading many to regard it as the single most important piece of banking
legislation enacted in the last four decades. 44
The Riegle-Neal Act also contained restrictions reminiscent of
the perceived need for regulation, promoting decentralized banking.4 5
Under the Riegle-Neal Act, interstate bank acquisitions must comply
with concentration limits; these limits set a maximum share of deposits
an organization can acquire both within a state and nationwide.4 6 The
Act also holds that the Federal Reserve Board (the "Board") may not
approve an application for merger if the merging bank (including all
insured depository institutions which are affiliates of that bank)
controls, or after the merger would control, more than ten percent of the
total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in the United
States.4 ' The Board also may not approve the application if the
applicant would control thirty percent or more of the insured deposits in
any state.48 A state may waive or amend the thirty percent deposit limit,
provided that it does not discriminate against out of state entrants.49
C.

Purpose and Intent of Drafters of the Riegle-Neal Act

According to Under Secretary of the Treasury Frank N.
Newman, the purposes of enacting the Riegle-Neal Act were many.50
First, it gives banks an opportunity to structure themselves more
efficiently by eliminating duplicative functions and reducing expenses.5'
Prior to enactment of the Riegle-Neal Act, an enterprising banker could

Id.; see also Jennifer Gordon, States Easing Interstate Branch Curbs, 166 AM. BANKER,

Mar. 19, 2001, at 1 (stating that most states have abandoned restrictions on interstate
branching).
44. 140 CONG. REC. H6,774-75 (1994) (statement of Rep. Kennedy).
45.
46.
47.
48.

See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
SPONG, supra note 40, at 177.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(A) (2000).
Id. § 1842(d)(2)(B).

49. Id. § 1842(d)(2)(C). A state may override this provision in either direction with an
alternative deposit cap. SPONG, supra note 40, at 177. About two-thirds of the states have
chosen not to adopt their own deposit cap or have officially adopted the same thirty percent
deposit cap specified in the legislation. Id. The remainder of the states have adopted a
different deposit cap and in most cases, this cap is less than thirty percent. Id.; see also 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (2000).
50. H.R. REP. No. 103-448, at 19 (1994), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2039, 2042.
51. Id.
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simply own a number of separate banks to avoid restrictions on
interstate branching, where regional laws permitted.52 However, this
form of banking was not conducive to centralized management or ready
access to the capital markets because the banks were necessarily a set of
entirely independent institutions united only by common individual
ownership.5 3 By allowing a bank to branch without restrictions, these
banks were able to consolidate duplicative managerial and financial
functions, allowing for increased efficiency and ease of management.54
The Riegle-Neal Act also encourages a more safe and sound
banking system by allowing banks to gather deposits across a wider
55
geographic area, thus allowing them to diversify their holdings.
Diversification insulates a bank from the negative economic effects of
regional economic downturns.56 History supports the positive aspects of
57
geographic diversity; during the 1920s and early 1930s unit banks
failed at a significantly higher rate than banks with branches.58
Branched banks were able to weather bank runs and, therefore avoid
failure, because of their more extensive sources of deposits and
earnings.5 9
In addition, the Riegle-Neal Act promotes customer
convenience, allowing consumers for the first time to bank at the branch
most convenient to them, whether that branch is across town or across
the country. 60 Large, centralized banks mean that customers will no
longer have to pay excessive fees for using other institutions' ATMs

52. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 19.

53. Id.
54. See H.R. REP. No. 103-448, at 19.
55. See 140 CONG. REC. H6,774-75 (1994) (statement of Rep. Neal).
56. 140 CONG. REC. H6,774, 6777 (1994) (statement of Rep. Roukema).

57. Unit banks are single bank units which own and operate in only one location.
supra note 7, at 12-13.
58. Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 983. In addition, a bank with branches in several
geographic areas should be able to attract a higher percentage of its deposits from individual
consumers. Id. FDIC-insured deposits owned by consumers are generally less volatile than
uninsured deposits owned by institutional investors. Id. Therefore, a geographically diverse
bank is likely to have a more stable deposit base and a lower risk of a run by depositors than
a unit bank. Id. at 984; see also Eugene N. White, A Reinterpretationof the Banking Crises
of 1930, 44 J. EcON. HIST. 119, 119-20, 131-32 (1984) (stating U.S. bank failures in 1930
were disproportionately concentrated in the category of small, local banks that did not have
branches and therefore were not geographically diverse).
59. Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 983.
60. 140 CONG. REC. H6,774, 6,777 (1994) (statement of Rep. Neal).
MACEY ET AL.,
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simply because they are away from their home bank.6 ' In addition,
geographic expansion permits banks to offer full-service banking at
remote locations. 62 Note, however, that the realization of this goal of
the Riegle-Neal Act is limited by the ten percent deposit cap.6 3
Though the Riegle-Neal Act eliminates many federal barriers to
interstate banking, the state and national deposit caps preserve the
federal government's tendency to strictly regulate the banking industry
64
and its concerns for adequate competition in financial markets.
According to Representative Roukema, "anti-concentration limits...
are extremely important in maintaining local competitiveness. 65
Those in favor of the deposit caps also argue that excessive
consolidation actually threatens the soundness of the banking system, as
some banks have become so large that the regulatory system cannot
allow them to fail. 66 This is known as the too big to fail policy. 67 If
these banks failed, the government would be forced to intervene to
prevent the potential damage to the nation's economy.68
The most famous case of "too big to fail" occurred in 1984
when a bank run6 9 by corporations and large financial institutions
threatened to bring down Continental Illinois National Bank.70 Many
small banks had deposits at Continental, and regulators feared that
61. Id.
62. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 346.
63. See infra discussion Part III.
64. See supra notes 25-38, 50-63 and accompanying text; see also 140 CONG. REC.
H6,774-75 (1994) (statement of Rep. Neal); Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregulation:
The Paradox of Financial Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 68-75 (1996) (stating that
between 1924 and 1933 Congress repeatedly considered but rejected proposed legislation
that would have permitted nationwide banking by national banks free from state
interference).
65. 140 CONG. REC. H6,774-75 (1994) (statement of Rep. Roukema).
66. Id.
67. Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 994-96. Under the too big to fail policy, as established
during the FDIC's rescue of Continental Illinois in 1984, federal bank regulators have
consistently protected both insured and uninsured depositors in large failing banks. Id.
68. Id. at 966. The FDIC, the Board, and the Secretary of the Treasury may jointly
decide to protect uninsured depositors or creditors in a failed bank, if they determine that
such action is necessary to avoid or mitigate "serious adverse effects on economic
conditions or financial stability." 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i)(I) (2000).
69. A bank run occurs when more depositors demand to withdraw their money at one
time than the bank has on hand. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 57-58. This generally
occurs when there is a generalized loss of confidence in the banking system. Id.
70. Id. at 336. At the time of the bank run, Continental Illinois was the seventh largest
bank in the country. Id. at 58.
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allowing Continental to fail might also cause many of those banks to
fail. 7 1 Regulators also feared that Continental's failure might topple
Accordingly, the Federal Deposit Insurance
other large banks.72
Corporation (the "FDIC") 73 disregarded the limit on deposit insurance
coverage and fully protected all Continental creditors.7 4 Although
subsequent analysis refuted the regulators' argument, the regulatory
agencies were not willing to take this chance.75
Thus, as was demonstrated by the case of Continental Illinois,
excessive banking industry consolidation could give rise to costly
federal bailouts of large national banks.76 The FDIC (and ultimately the
taxpayers) could be called upon to invest billions to save these
behemoths.7 7 This "too big to fail" status could in turn give rise to
moral hazard, a theory which states that an insured actor takes excessive
risks because the loss will not be borne directly by the risk-taker but by
the insurer, in this instance the FDIC.78 Thus, regular market pressures
to act in a risk-adverse manner would not apply because the banks have
a bail-out mechanism in place for their risky actions. 79 This puts
smaller banks at a disadvantage, as they are not free to act with
impunity.80 In addition, to compete for the funds of the larger,
uninsured depositors, smaller banks may be forced to offer higher
interest rates to compensate depositors for the increased risk associated
71. Id. at 336.
72. Id.

73. The FDIC insures deposits at banks and thrift institutions. Id. at 71.
74. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 336-37. The FDIC's current limit on bank deposits
is $100,000 per depositor per institution. Id.
75. Id.
76. Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 1002-04.
77. Id.
78. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 20, at 517.

79. Id.; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk
Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1153, 1181-82 (1988)
[hereinafter Bank Failures].
80. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, VOLUME I: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
at
(1997)
248
1990s
EARLY
AND
1980S
THE
OF
CRISES
BANKING

http://www.fdic.gov/databank/hist80 (last visited Jan. 17, 2004) [hereinafter BANKING
CRISES]. There was a correlation between bank size and resolution method. Id. During the
period 1986-91, for example, the average asset size of institutions that were resolved by
insured-deposit payoff and liquidation was approximately $65 million, whereas the average
asset size of institutions that were resolved with the protection of uninsured depositors, was
about $200 million. Id.; see also Kenneth Bacon, Failuresof a Big Bank and a Little Bank
Bring Fairness of Deposit-Security Policy into Question, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1990, at A18;
Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 1003.
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with banking at such institutions. 8
III. THE NATIONAL DEPOSIT CAP: ARBITRARY AND UNNECESSARY
A.

Antitrust Provisionsare Already Present

Many laws and regulations strictly regulate banks and BHCs
beyond the simple prohibition of the national deposit cap.82 The Bank
Merger Act 83 and the Bank Holding Company Act 84 provide the
antitrust guidelines by which banks and BHCs must abide. 85 These
regulations involve the application of both general antitrust principles,
as well as strict regulations pertaining specifically to the banking
industry.8 6
There are two basic statutes in American antitrust law that apply
to all mergers and acquisitions, in all industries.87 The Sherman Act
provides that any person who shall monopolize trade, or attempts to
monopolize trade, is guilty of a criminal offense. 88 The Clayton Act
prohibits transactions whose effects would substantially lessen
competition or to create a monopoly. 89 The banking antitrust laws in the
Bank Merger Act and the Bank Holding Company Act are borrowed
from these two principal antitrust statutes and also focus on whether a
merger will substantially lessen competition. 90 Thus, in many important
respects, the antitrust standards applicable under the banking laws are

81. Bank Failures,supra note 79, at 1182.
82. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 378-81.

83. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2000). The Bank Merger Act governs mergers between
federally insured commercial banks. Id.
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2000). The Bank Holding Company Act governs mergers,
consolidations or acquisitions of banks or bank holding companies by institutions that are or
will become bank holding companies. Id.
85. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 378-81.

86. Id. at 379-80.
87. Id.

88. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). The Sherman Act provides that "every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States" is guilty of a criminal offense. Id.
89. Id. § 18. The Clayton Act prohibits transactions "where in any line of commerce in
any section of the country, the effect ... may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly." Id.
90. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 379-80. See generally LoVErs, supra note 7, at 198-
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identical to those applicable under the general antitrust laws. 9'
However, general antitrust law does not require prior regulatory

approval for mergers; general antitrust law only requires that, in certain
instances, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
be notified of any pending merger plans. 92 Conversely, any BHC
wishing to consolidate or merge is required to submit a written
application to its regulating agency, either the Office of the Comptroller
93
of the Currency or the Federal Reserve Board, prior to approval. The
relevant agency will consider many factors including monopolization,
anti-competitiveness, traditional banking factors, and supervisory
94
It also
factors in deciding whether to approve the application.
prospects
future
and
resources
managerial
and
"financial
the
considers
of the existing and proposed institutions. 95 Further, each merger
application is subject to double review; once the merger has been
approved by the responsible bank regulatory agency, the merger is
stayed for thirty days pending a second, independent review of the
competitive factors by the Department of Justice.9 6 Thus, both the
banking regulatory agency and the Department of Justice perform
antitrust analysis of pending bank mergers. 97
91. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 379-80.
92. DALE A. OESTERLE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 277-78 (1st ed. 2001). There are
certain thresholds that must be met in order for the filing requirement to apply. Id. After
notification, there is a mandated waiting period before any deal closes. Id. If either the
Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission issues a request for additional
information, the request tolls the waiting period. Id.
93. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)-(b) (2000). This regulatory agency may be the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency or the Federal Reserve Board, depending on whether the
resulting entity is national or state in nature. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (2000).
94. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2000); 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2000); see also MALLOY, supra
note 23, at 86-87 (1999) (listing explanations and examples of the factors considered by the
Federal Reserve Board when reviewing a BHC merger or consolidation application).
95. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (2000).
96. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4), (6), (7) (2000).
97. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 378-81. Once the antitrust analysis is completed, if
the banking regulatory agency approves the merger but the Department of Justice challenges
it, the court review of the Department of Justice action is de novo. United States v. Third
Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 178 (1968). This often occurs when the regulatory
agency utilizes the public interest exception and the Department of Justice disagrees, or
when the agencies disagree on the relevant product or geographic markets. Id. See
generally United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967); United States v.
Conn. Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974). The burden of establishing the applicability of the
exception falls on the regulatory agency and on the banks seeking to merge. First City Nat'l
Bank, 386 U.S. at 366. Once the matter is subject to judicial review, the merger is stayed
until the hearings are completed. Id. at 369-70.
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When performing the antitrust analysis, although there are no
exact quantitative or qualitative tests to determine whether a merger is
likely to 'substantially' lessen competition, the regulatory agency takes
into account 1) the market share of the parties to the merger, 2) the
market shares of other participants in the same market, and 3) other
relevant factors.98 Such factors help the regulators to gauge the
merger's probable effects on competition and call for the regulator to
make inquiries such as whether the merger would create barriers to
entry in the relevant market. 99
In order to determine the market shares to be used, the regulator
must first identify the relevant geographic and product markets in which
the merger will or may impair the competition.' °° The geographic
market must reflect commercial and banking realities and should consist
of the local area where the banks in question offer their services and
where local customers can practicably turn for alternatives.' 0 ' The
appropriate product market has consistently been recognized as the
cluster of products and services offered by banking institutions. 10 2
Once the relevant geographic and product markets have been
identified, the analysis turns to an assessment of the degree of
concentration in the relevant market before and after the proposed
transaction. 0 3 To calculate this, both the applicable federal banking
98. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 20, at 729-30.
99. Id. Market share figures reflect the extent to which the market is concentrated and
the extent to which consummation of the proposed merger will increase market
concentration. Id. The more concentrated the market is, the more likely it is that one
participant could successfully exercise market power. Id.
100. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 383.
101. Order Approving the Merger of Bank Holding Companies: NationsBank - Barnett
Bank, in 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 129, 130-31 (1997) [hereinafter NationsBank]. The Department
of Justice defines geographic market as a region such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing
firm that was a monopolist likely would impose at least a "small but significant and by the
nontransitory" increase in price. Definition of a Geographic Market: U.S. Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg.
41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992).
102. NationsBank, supra note 101, at 130-31. The Department of Justice defines
product market as a region such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was a
monopolist likely would impose at least a "small but significant and by the nontransitory"
increase in price. Definition of a Product Market: U.S. Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept. 10,
1992); see also United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963) (determining
that the relevant product market for commercial banking is the "cluster of products and
services denoted by the term commercial banking").
103. MACEY ETAL., supra note 7, at 415.
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agency and the Department of Justice use the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) to measure market concentration; the Index measures the
market share of each firm in the market and is measured for every
merger applicant.' °4 In the banking industry, traditionally, market
shares of banks have been approximated by the percentage of deposits
held by each bank in the relevant geographic market.105 This is
calculated for both the pre-merger market, and then again, assuming
merger has taken place, to determine the post-merger
that the proposed
06
HHI.1
market's
For banking mergers, the HHI analysis is completed on a more
specific level than for those in other industries. 10 7 In 1996, the
Department of Justice and the federal bank regulators issued additional,
informal guidelines to be used when assessing the HHI for bank
mergers. 10 8 The guidelines set up two different levels of measuring
concentration; if the resulting concentration figures from the standard
test exceeds a specified level, the agency applies a second test to further
explore the proposed changes to competition in that market.'0 9
The index, while helpful, is not determinative. "0 It is only a
guideline used by regulators to help identify cases in which a more
detailed competitive analysis is appropriate."' Any additional analysis
would explore the specific effects on each market and whether any
additional factors mitigate the potential effects of the proposed merger
on competition." 12 The regulators then challenge a merger if analysis

104. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 20, at 729. The HHI analysis is used by the

Department of Justice for all mergers; it is not specific to the banking industry. Id.
105. Id. at 729-30.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 417.
Id.
Id.
NationsBank, supra note 101, at 131-32.

A proposal that fails to pass the HHI

market screen may, nonetheless, be approved because other information indicates that the
proposal would not have a significantly adverse effect on competition. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.

For example, in the NationsBank and Barnett Bank merger, the bank

overlooked the HHI numbers in seventeen of the banking markets, finding that additional
factors mitigated the potential effects of the proposal on competition. Id. Additional
information taken into account includes evidence that the merging parties do not
significantly compete with one another, evidence that market shares are not an adequate
indicator of the extent of competition in the market, and evidence concerning entry
conditions. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 417-18.
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shows that the resulting market would be too concentrated." 3 Thus, by
applying antitrust standards such as the HHI and the specifics of the
actual market to be affected, the regulatory agencies are already taking
into account the effect of a bank's market share of deposits on a more
effective, specific level than an analysis of a national deposit average." 14
The above-mentioned safeguards alone contain more strict
requirements than those required for mergers within any other industry,
subjecting banks to an additional layer of complexity, delay and
expense. 15 This regulatory scrutiny ensures that large banks cannot
6
gain concentrated power in a particular market or market segment."
By analyzing market concentration consequences for each merger, the
regulatory agency adequately addresses the fear of industry
concentration." 7 For example, in inter-market mergers (in which one
bank purchases another bank in the same geographic market), the
increased market share of the newly expanded bank would come under
scrutiny. 118
B.

Competitive Market Processes Should Be Left Untouched

Competitive market forces, along with antitrust regulations
currently in place, adequately police the marketplace to ensure adequate
competition and lack of undue concentration. " 9 Representative Neal,
for whom the Act was named, noted the importance of allowing the
market to govern the industry and stated "the Act will give banks the
ability to expand pursuant to market forces, by eliminating artificial

113.

MACEY ETAL., supra note 7, at 417-18.

114. See supra notes 82-113 and accompanying text.
115. MACEY ETAL., supra note 7, at 380. Under conventional antitrust analysis, a market
in which no one firm controls more than ten percent of the action would be viewed as highly
unconcentrated and there would be no thought of regulation. Id. at 370.
116. Id. at 378-81.

117. See supra notes 82-116 and accompanying text.
118. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 369. However, in the situation of market extension
mergers, in which a bank merges with or acquires another bank in a new geographic area,
the number of competitors in the new market is not being reduced and therefore traditional
antitrust principles would not apply. Id.; see also Chad F. Brown, Bank Mergers in
Concentrated Markets: The Role of Mitigating Factors, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 345, 351

(1998) (stating that there are other options in place to mitigate the decrease in competition
including divestiture of various branches); LOVETr, supra note 7, at 203-04.
119. See infra notes 120-40 and accompanying text.
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12
geographic boundaries."

The national deposit cap hampers the traditional means of
consolidation and growth, and the governing ability of competitive
121
market process, while placing artificial constraints on the market.
Government regulators have noted this negative effect on traditional
bank mergers. 122 In 1999, Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence
H. Meyer, while praising the Riegle-Neal Act for lifting some barriers,
noted that the law imposes deposit caps that may force some banks to
walk away from mergers. 23 In fact, not only do many of the industry's
regulators find the cap to be intrusive, but many believe that it should be
eliminated all together. 24 "We have a market-driven system that is
based on disclosure and opportunity and transparency and mobility,"
said former Comptroller of the Currency Eugene A. Ludwig. "That has
really been essential in terms of the U.S.'s leadership in the world.
Standing in the way of that is very dangerous.' 25
These regulators believe in the benefit of allowing the market to
regulate itself through economic forces. 26 There is no sound economic
rationale for deposit caps, according to Federal Reserve Board
Governor Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., "caps are a second line of defense
that focuses more on perceptions of concentration of power as opposed
to the science of economics. " 27 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Chairman Don Powell stated 28 "My bias is to let market forces
determine the evolution of the banking industry. If... banks show
signs of becoming too big to manage, I would expect the market to
slow, if not reverse, the course of consolidation and regulators to
impose stricter sanctions," noting that banking is less consolidated than
120. 140 CONG. REC. H6,774-75 (1994) (statement of Rep. Neal).
121. See generally MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 369-70.
122. Jaret Seiberg, Fed's Meyer Callsfor Looser Restrictions on Bank Mergers, 164 AM.
BANKER, Jan. 5, 1999, at 1.
123. Id.
124. Michele Heller, FDIC Chief Suggests Ten Percent Cap On Deposits Isn't
Necessary, AM. BANKER, Apr. 21, 2004, at 4.
125. Rehm, supra note 7, at 1. He is now the managing partner of Promontory Financial
Group LLC in Washington. Id.
126. Heller, supra note 124, at 4; see also Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan, Address at the Chicago Bank Structure Conference (May 6, 1993).
127. Jaret Seiberg, Anti-Bigness Sentiment Keeps Deposit Share Caps Alive, 163 AM.

BANKER, Sept. 10, 1998, at 3 [hereinafter Anti-Bigness] (quoting House Banking Committee
Chairman Jim Leach).
128. Heller, supra note 124, at 4.
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ten other major U.S. industries. 29 Banks should be allowed to take
advantage of perceived opportunities to increase profitability by
improving efficiency and leave it to the market to discipline errors in
this regard. 3 °
In any freely competitive market, the market will gravitate
toward the equilibrium price and supply, maximizing both market
efficiency and consumer satisfaction.13 ' Market regulations that stifle
the efficient market process impose a burden on the efficiency of the
banking industry. 132 With the elimination of geographic constraints,
banks have become free, assuming antitrust requirements were met, to
expand into any geographic area in which they felt they could be
efficient, competitive, and profitable. 33 The need to survive would
move banks toward healthy competition, thus allowing consumers to
enjoy the benefits of potentially lower borrowing rates, expanded
134
services, and more favorable credit provisions.
This cannot be accomplished while deposit caps, an artificial
constraint on the market, are in place. 135 According to Steven C.
Sunshine, the Justice Department's former top bank merger lawyer, the
deposit caps may hurt consumers.136 "You prevent efficiencies and raise
costs, which is the antithesis of what you want to achieve."'13 In
addition, instead of allowing the regulating agency to weigh the benefits
to consumers against the costs to competition, the nationwide deposit
129. Id. Chairman Powell stated "This approach seems to be a better gauge of the
appropriate scale of banking organizations than does an arbitrary fixed cap."

Id.

The

comments were in a prepared statement to a Senate Banking Committee hearing where
federal and state regulators reported the robust health of the banking, thrift and credit union
industries. Id.; see also Seiberg, supra note 122, at 1.

130. Seiberg, supra note 122, at 1 (quoting Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence
H. Meyer).
131. JEFFERY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 14 (2d ed. 2000).

132. Greenspan, supra note 126.
133. See HARRISON, supra note 131, at 7-14 (explaining general economic analysis of

supply and demand).
134.

See id.; see also HELEN A. GARTEN, US FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE LEVEL

PLAYING FIELD 34 (2001) (stating that to the extent that regulation tries to interfere with that
structure, market players find ways around regulatory impediments, making them
superfluous); Greenspan, supra note 126 (stating that "consumers of financial services are
denied the lower prices, increased access, and higher quality services that would accompany
the increased competition associated with permitting banking companies to expand their
activities").
135. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
136. Anti-Bigness, supra note 127, at 3.
137. Id.
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cap imposes an objective limit which does not take into account
138
subjective factors.
Finally, if the market power shifts and becomes out of balance,
the market should correct itself. 139 If the market shifts towards a
monopoly, the monopoly price will attract other banks from distant
markets who could not have covered their entrance and transactions
costs had the competitive price been charged. 140 This self-policing
character of the market, when coupled with an already robust regulatory
regime, relegates the cap to an unnecessary regulation.
C.

"Too Big to Fail" Concerns Not Protectedby the Deposit Cap

As a measure of prevention against the undue concentration of
financial size and power, one possible justification for the deposit cap is
4
that it protects the industry against a bank becoming too big to fail.' '
The cap, however, does not prevent this situation, as evidenced by
historical federal intervention of bank failures and a comparison of the
size and influence of those institutions to the giants of today's banking
142
industry.
At the time of its rescue by the FDIC, Continental was the
seventh largest bank in the United States, with approximately $40
billion in assets. 143 In January 1991, the FDIC again aided three
banking subsidiaries of the Bank of New England Corporation, with
total assets at the time of failure of $21.9 billion. 144 In fact, in the late
1980s, the FDIC was protecting uninsured depositors at banks with less
than $1 billion in assets. 145 During that period, the Comptroller of the
Currency stated that the nation's eleven largest banks, with total assets

138. See discussion infra Part IV.
139. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 305 (6th ed. 2003).

140. Id. For example, a bank that, upon obtaining a large market share statewide or
nationwide, begins to raise prices will be susceptible to other state and national banking
firms willing to compete at lower prices. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7 at 371.
141.

See supra notes 66-81 and accompanying text; see also MACEY ET AL., supra note 7,

at 369-70.
142. See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.

143. BANKING CRISES, supra note 80, at 237-38.
144. Id. at 252.
145. Symposium, The Future of Low and FinancialServices: The New Policy Agenda
for FinancialServices, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 113, 149 (1992).
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146
ranging from $30 to $118 billion, were too big to fail.
In today's banking industry, there are currently forty-one
institutions with assets over $30 million. 47 The largest banks have
assets in excess of $1 trillion. 48 If the failure of much smaller banks
could potentially cause a national crises and necessitate federal rescue,
then clearly the failure of dozens of today's banks could as well. 149 It is
apparent that many banks have already passed over the too big to fail
threshold. 50 Note, however, that all of today's potentially crisescausing banks fall within the ten percent deposit cap.'
Critical mass,
therefore, is clearly reached well before ten percent of deposits are
obtained. 5 2 Thus, while the concern remains that banks will become
too big to fail, the ten percent deposit cap is an ineffectual method of
53
managing this problem. 1

In addition, legislative reforms have decreased the risk of bank
154
failure, thus diminishing the import of the too big to fail doctrine.
Since the FDIC rescued Continental Illinois in 1984, Congress has
sought to curtail the impact of the too big to fail doctrine on bank risk
through legislative reforms. 155 The implementation of risk-based capital
adequacy guidelines has reduced the probability that a large institution
will fail. 56 These guidelines are especially effective in preventing bank
failures, the linchpin of the too big to fail problem, because they impose
a series of increasingly stringent, nondiscretionary regulatory

146. Tim Carrington, U.S. Won't Let 11 Biggest Banks in Nation Fail, WALL ST. J., Sept.

20, 1984, at 2 (quoting testimony of Comptroller of the Currency Conover at House
Banking Committee hearing on Sept. 18-19, 1984); see also BANKING CRISES, supra note
80, at 237-38.
147. Bank and Thrift Holding Companies with the Most Assets, 201 AM. BANKER, Oct,
19, 2004, at 8 [hereinafter Bank Assets].
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 143-58 and accompanying text.
150. See generally Bank Assets, supra note 147.
151. See generally id.
152. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
154. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 336-38.
155. Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic
Analysis, 77 IOWA LAW REV. 1083, 1106 (1992); see also MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at
337.

156. Miller, supra note 155, at 1106. The guidelines take explicit account of the risk of
off-balance sheet activities, which were principally engaged in by the larger banks. Id. The
effect of the risk-based guidelines has been to increase the capital cushion-the protection
against insolvency. Id.
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157
requirements as an institution's capital falls below acceptable levels.
Thus, the deposit cap does not prevent banks from becoming too big to
fail, and Congress has addressed the problem of bank failures
58
directly. 1

D.

State Deposit Cap Should Suffice

In addition to the nationwide deposit cap, the Riegle-Neal Act
provides that the regulatory agency may not approve the merger
application if the applicant would control thirty percent or more of the
total amount of insured depository institution deposits in the state in
which the bank to be acquired is located. 159 States are allowed to raise
or lower the rates for their states as their state legislatures see fit,
allowing them to regulate market concentration within their own
state. 160 Many states have chosen to exercise this option and alter their
state deposit cap. 161 Some states, such as Arkansas and New Mexico,
have increased the cap to as high as fifty percent, while other states,
such as Missouri and Nebraska, have decreased the deposit cap to as

157. Id.; see also Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E)
(2000).
158. See supra notes 141-57 and accompanying text.
159. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(B) (2000). The concern for state autonomy from national
banking regulation has been shown throughout the history of American banking law.
MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 12, 110-15. A driving force behind early pieces of bank
branching legislation was Congress' desire to ensure competitive equality in branching
between national and state banks. Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 973. This concern over state
control of the banking industry was expressed repeatedly during Congressional hearings and
debates concerning the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act. 140 CONG. REc. H6,774 (1994).
The deposit cap, in particular, was an important state's rights issue put into the Riegle-Neal
Act to reassure bankers, consumer groups, and state officials who were concerned about the
loss of state control to federal regulation. 140 CONG. REC. H6,774, 6778 (1994) (statement
of Rep. Bereuter). The cap was addressed specifically by Representative Vento, who stated
that "as an additional protection for state rights, the legislation specifically protects state
deposit caps." 140 CONG. REC. H6,774, 6,781 (1994) (statement of Rep. Vento); see also
statements of Rep. Roukema and Rep. Castle. In a letter mailed to members of the House of
Representatives, the Independent Bankers Association of America stated that state rights
must be protected and must not be pre-empted by federal law. Letter from Kenneth A.
Guenther, Executive Vice President, the Independent Bankers Association of America, to
Honorable Henry B. Gonzalez, U.S. House of Representatives (June 7, 1994) (on file with
author).
160. Anti-Bigness, supra note 127, at 3; see also MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 370.
161. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Branching Continues to Thrive as the U.S.
System
Consolidates,
at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2004/
Banking
102004fyi.html (Oct. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Branching].
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low as thirteen percent. 62 Michigan and Utah abolished the deposit cap
entirely. 63 Since the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act, there has been a
drastic increase in the number of cases where an institution holds a
share of deposits in a state that either approaches or exceeds the marketshare cap for that state.' 64 Five states have banks or holding companies
within five percent of their deposit cap; thirteen states have banks or
165
holding companies within ten percent of the state deposit cap.
State regulators are more familiar with the active markets being
regulated and have an improved view of the circumstances surrounding
the markets. 66 They are in the best position to determine matters that
affect the financial and economic development of their states. 67 The
states, through the state deposit caps, can protect community-oriented
banks and monitor the effects of increased concentration and lessened
competition on local citizens more effectively than can be done through
68
the nationwide cap.
IV. UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING CALCULATION OF THE DEPOSIT CAP

In addition to the policy arguments against the deposit cap
discussed in Section III, many facets of the calculation of the deposit
cap are uncertain. 169 These uncertainties detract from the significance of
the deposit cap as a means of measuring market concentration.
The Riegle-Neal Act does not currently provide a legislatively
mandated formula to be used in calculating the deposit cap. 170 The
statute simply provides that no newly merged bank can hold "more than
ten percent of the total amount of deposits of insured depository

162. Id.;

see

also

The

New

Rules

Project,

Market

Share

Caps,

at

http://www.newrules.org/finance/mshare.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
163.
164.
165.
166.

Anti-Bigness, supra note 127, at 3.
Branching, supra note 161.
Id.
See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 1069-76. In view of the repeated failures by federal

bank regulators in the 1980s to discern serious managerial errors and dangerous operational
risks at large banks and to take appropriate supervisory measures to deal with such
problems, the states should be allowed to play a supporting role in regulating local branches
of out-of-state banks. Id. at 1070.
167. See Letter from Kenneth A. Guenther, supra note 159.
168. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 170-203 and accompanying text.
170. BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 1,at 8.
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institutions in the United States."' 1 As the terms used in the Act are not
defined, the Board, who has responsibility for regulatory approval of
mergers between nationally chartered banks, 172 has adopted the
definitions of the terms as contained in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act (the "FDI Act"). 173 However, because these definitions are not
174
clear, they have been applied inconsistently to different mergers.
During the recent Bank of America merger, several commentators
presented differing views on how to calculate the deposit cap,
175
demonstrating the uncertainty with which the cap is applied.
The variables in applying the cap are many. 176 There has been
ambiguity as to which geographic areas should be included in the
calculation, as the FDI Act does not define the terms "state" and
"United States."' 177 The Board has read the terms to include any
territory of the United States, including Guam, Puerto Rico, and
American Samoa. 178 Many commentators have asserted that deposits
held in these territories and Puerto Rico should not be included because
these areas are not "states."' 179 The Board reasons, however, that this
interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the nationwide deposit
cap, as all banks operating in these areas are eligible for federal deposit
insurance and are thus subject to the jurisdiction of the FDIC. 8 ° The
Board argues that these areas must be included in order to ensure the
antitrust purpose of the deposit cap is met; if these areas were not
included then an institution could enter them without limit, thereby
increasing that institution's control of the market.' 8 '
In addition, there has been argument over what represents the
171. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(A) (2000).
172. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Recent issues concerning deposit cap
calculation have mainly concerned nationally chartered banks, and, thus, the Federal
Reserve Board has been the regulating agency. See generally BANK OF AMERICA, supra
note 1; NationsBank, supra note 101.
173. BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 1, at 8.
174. See generally id.
175. Id.

176. Id. at 8-10.
177. Id.
178. BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 1, at 8-10.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. This definition is also consistent with the definition of "United States"
contained in the Board's Regulation Y, which governs applications under § 3 of the BHC

Act. Id.
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best and most complete data to be used to calculate the deposit cap. 182
The FDI Act's definition of "deposit" does not specify what source the
information should be obtained from; different sources take into account
different factors, and thus give different results. 8 3 In the past, the Board
has used assorted sources of information to calculate the deposit cap for
different mergers.18 4 For example, the Board has used Summary of
Deposits data for the calculation of the deposit cap in past merger
applications, however, the Board used a different source of information
for the 2004 Bank of America-FleetBoston merger. 185 The lack of a
uniform source of information negatively affects the meaningfulness of
the final calculation, and hinders the ability to compare the percentage
86
of deposits held among newly merged institutions.
Finally, disagreement persists as to whether the Federal Reserve
Board should include credit union deposits in their figures. 187 The
definition of "bank" adopted by the Board does not include credit
unions, even though credit unions perform virtually the same functions
as banks. 188 These functions include checking accounts, nonresidential
real estate loans, non-mortgage consumer loans (including credit cards),
commercial loans, and the ability to exercise trust and fiduciary
powers. 189 In addition, credit union deposits are federally insured.' 90 It
has been stated that banking regulatory agencies now view credit unions
as the functional equivalent of commercial banks.' 9'
Looking at the similarities between credit unions and banks, a
182. Id. at 8-10.
183. Id. at 8-10.
184. BANK OF AMERICA, supra note 1, at 8.

185. Id. The Summary of Deposits information was used for the Fleet Financial and
BankBoston merger. Id. The FDIC used the figures from the Consolidated Report of
Condition and Income, which is reported to the FDIC each quarter, to calculate the total
amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in the United States and the total
amount of deposits held by Bank of America, both before and upon consummation of the
proposed transaction, for purposes of applying the nationwide deposit cap. Id.
186. See supra notes 170-85 and accompanying text.
187. Credit unions are nonprofit cooperative financial institutions that provide credit to
its members. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 304 (9th ed. 1984).
188. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 20, at 98, 116-17; see St. Mary's Bank v. United
States, 425 F. Supp. 512 (D.N.H. 1976); see also Lissa L. Broome, The Influence of
Enhanced Thrift Institution Powers on Commercial Bank Market Expansion, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 795 (1989) [hereinafter Influence].
189. BROOME& MARKHAM, supra note 20, at 116-17.
190. Id. at 98.
191. Influence, note 188, at 797.
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strong argument can be made that the inclusion of credit unions is
consistent with the purpose of the nationwide cap. 192 The main
justifications given for the deposit cap are the prevention of undue
market concentration and the fear of lack of competition in the banking
industry.' 93 However, as credit unions continue to service banking
customers, particularly those who prefer local credit unions to large
194
national banks, they should be taken into account.
In addition, competition from credit unions may be considered
by the Department of Justice when evaluating the antitrust
consequences of a merger and calculating the HHI.' 9' The Department
of Justice may decide that a credit union within the relevant product or
geographic market offers such services that it should be considered to
be in the market and thus part of the calculation. 196 It is not logical to
have credit unions considered when analyzing other aspects of
marketplace competition, but not to have their deposits counted when
197
measuring the deposit cap.
In considering the importance of this debate, note that there are
about 9,600 credit unions. 198 Inclusion of credit union deposits would
increase the current amount of nationwide deposits by 8.8%.' 99 This
would reduce Bank of America's total share to 8.78%, a tremendous
shift.2°°
The continuing uncertainties over all facets of the calculation of
the deposit cap dilute its value and the confidence in its application.2
At the very least, the Board should issue an official interpretation to
ensure uniformity in application. °2 In addition, Congress should take
192. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.

193. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
194. See generally Influence, note 188.
195. MACEY ET AL., supra note 7, at 418.
196. Id.; see also Influence, note 188, at 826-27.

197. See supra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.
198. Talcott, supra note 10, at El.

199. Boraks, supra note 9, at 1; Talcott, supra note 10, at El.
200. Boraks, supra note 9, at 1; Talcott, supra note 10, at El; see also Rob Blackwell,
Market Beats Congress to a Deposit Cap "Fix," AM. BANKER, June 6, 2001, at 1. A Bank

of America spokeswoman said "We consider this to be an artificial cap that doesn't apply to
any other company, industry, or country. We are very much in favor of redefining the
denominator of the cap ... we would like to see it include both domestic and foreign banks
and credit unions." Id.
201.

See supra notes 169-200 and accompanying text.

202. This rule-making will be given great deference upon judicial review. See generally
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these uncertainties into consideration and consider either clarifying the
cap or repealing it altogether. °3
V. CONCLUSION

By allowing bank expansion without artificial geographic
constraints, the Riegle-Neal Act was intended to promote the
consolidation of banks and BHCs, to increase bank efficiency and
effectiveness, and to benefit consumers through increased convenience
and expanded services. 20 4 The Riegle-Neal Act also contains many
restrictions reminiscent of the perceived need for heavy regulation and
decentralized banking, particularly through the provisions in the
national and state deposit caps.20 5 Proponents of the geographic
restrictions cite the need for protection of community-based banks and
the lack of undue concentration in banking markets in order to protect
consumers and ensure competitive equality.20 6 However, there are
already adequate measures in place to address these concerns without
resorting to an artificial deposit cap.20 7
First, antitrust regulations are already in place which will
effectively handle the inquiry into market concentration and
competition concerns. 20 8 Through implementation of both general
antitrust regulations and those specific to the banking industry,
regulators take into account a bank's share of deposits on a more
20 9
effective, specific level than is considered in the deposit cap.
Second, market forces are capable of deriving stable and
efficient markets, allowing for increased customer satisfaction and a
more stable banking industry.2 10 There is no sound economic rationale
for the deposit cap; market forces should determine the evolution of the
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (stating that
the courts have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer and should give
deference to administrative interpretations).
203. See supra notes 169-202 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 25-38, 50-68 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 25-38, 64-68 and accompanying text.
207. See discussion supra Part III.
208. See discussion supra Part III.A.
209. See discussion supra Part III.A.
210. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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banking industry. 21 1 The self-policing character of the market will help
to ensure competitive equality.2 12
In addition, the deposit cap is not effective in preventing too big
to fail situations.21 3 As the critical size for too big to fail is reached well
before banks arrive at the ten percent deposit threshold, the cap is an
214
Also, there are state
inadequate means for controlling bank size.
deposit caps already in place in each state, which are more effective at
protecting local communities and community banks against undue
State governments are in the best position to
concentration.21 5
determine matters that affect the financial and economic development of
216

their states.
Finally, many facets of the calculation of the deposit cap are
uncertain; including which geographic areas should be considered, what
source of data should be used and whether credit union deposits should
be included. 217 These uncertainties detract from the significance of the
21 8
deposit cap and the confidence in the resulting number.
According to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, "once
[banking] legislation is passed, it must be implemented in a way that
preserves its value to the banking system, by not confining banks in a
regulatory straitjacket that stifles innovation and prudent risk
management. ' '21 9 Thus, as effective measures are already in place that
more efficiently address the concerns of competition and concentration,
Congress should repeal the ten percent nationwide deposit cap.
CYBIL WHITE
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See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part IV.
See discussion supra Part IV.
Greenspan, supra note 126.
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